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ABSTRACT
Criticality Evaluation of Plutonium-239 Moderated by High-Density Polyethylene in Stainless Steel 
and Aluminum Containers Suitable for Non-Exclusive Transport. TIMOTHY T. WATSON 
(Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York 12180) JOHN SCORBY (Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, Livermore, California 94550)
Research is conducted at the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Facility (JASPER) on the 
effects of high pressure and temperature environments on plutonium-239, in support of the 
stockpile stewardship program.  Once an experiment has been completed, it is necessary to transport 
the end products for interim storage or final disposition.  Federal shipping regulations for non-
exclusive use transportation require that no more than 180 grams of fissile material are present in at 
least 360 kilograms of contiguous non-fissile material.  To evaluate the conservatism of these 
regulatory requirements, a worst-case scenario of 180g 239Pu and a more realistic scenario of 100g 
239Pu were modeled using one of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Monte Carlo transport 
codes known as COG 10.  The geometry consisted of 239Pu spheres homogenously mixed with high-
density polyethylene surrounded by a cube of either stainless steel 304 or aluminum.  An optimized 
geometry for both cube materials and hydrogen-to-fissile isotope (H/X) ratio were determined for a 
single unit.  Infinite and finite 3D arrays of these optimized units were then simulated to determine 
if the systems would exceed criticality.  Completion of these simulations showed that the optimal 
H/X ratio for the most reactive units ranged from 800 to 1600.  A single unit of either cube type for 
either scenario would not reach criticality.  An infinite array was determined to reach criticality only 
for the 180g case.  The offsetting of spheres in their respective cubes was also considered and 
showed a considerable decrease in the number of close-packed units needed to reach criticality.  
iv
These results call into question the current regulations for fissile material transport, which under 
certain circumstances may not be sufficient in preventing the development of a critical system.  
However, a conservative, theoretical approach was taken in all assumptions and such idealized 
configurations may not be likely to be encountered in actual packaging, transportation, and storage 
configurations.  Modeling of realistic, as-built configurations is beyond the scope of this study.
1INTRODUCTION
The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility (JASPER) is a two stage 
light gas gun which studies the effects of high pressure and temperature environments on various 
heavy metals, such as plutonium-239 in order to support the stockpile stewardship program.  As a 
result of these efforts, waste products are created and must be transported off-site for disposal.  
Since 239Pu is a fissile isotope it has the potential, given the wrong geometry, moderation, reflection, 
and spacing, to reach criticality.  Such a configuration would be extremely hazardous for the public 
and for the workers transporting this material, as well as provide for an expensive environmental 
decontamination effort.  At the same time, it is prudent to provide the most cost-effective and 
efficient method of transport as possible.  
In Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 453, Part 173, an allowance exists 
under which a package of fissile material may be shipped as a non-“exclusive-use” item and, thus, an 
assigned a Criticality Safety Index (CSI) is not required.  Such an exemption would greatly reduce the 
time and cost necessary for a strict analysis.  The regulations state:
“There is no more than 180 grams of fissile material distributed within 360 kilograms of 
contiguous non-fissile material.  Lead, beryllium, graphite, and hydrogenous material 
enriched in deuterium may be present in the package, but must not be included in 
determining the required mass of solid non-fissile material.”
This research is intended to verify the adequacy of the federal regulation listed above, and to 
determine if an actual package, which would contain of only ~100g 239Pu would ever reach critical in 
varying configurations.
2MATERIALS AND METHODS
All simulations were performed using Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Monte 
Carlo transport code known as COG 10.  This code was developed by Dr. Richard Buck, Dr. 
Edward Lent, and Dr. Thomas Wilcox.  COG 10 was run on the Criticality Safety Section’s 
unclassified workstation, Surya.  This system is a rack mounted Sun Fire V480 workstation with 4 
Ultra SPARC III Cu 1.2 GHz processors and 8 GB of dynamic memory running under the Sun 
Solaris 5.8 Unix operating system.  This software was installed and verified by Shang-Chih Philip 
Chou in July 2006. [1]
The geometry selected for simulation was intentionally chosen to both resemble an actual 
shipping container used for radiological waste transport, and to have a worst-case scenario 
configuration that would be the most likely to cause criticality.  Two separate given quantities of 
plutonium-239 were modeled in homogeneous mixture with high-density polyethylene in the shape 
of a sphere.  One case consisted of 180g Pu-239, while the other consisted of only 100g Pu-239.   
This sphere, for a majority of the cases run, was centered in a solid cube of either aluminum (Al) or 
stainless steel 304 (SS 304).  Both materials were selected for modeling, as both can be the main 
constituents of a typical package assembly. Refer to Figure 5 for a generic COG-generated cross 
section view of the assembly.
Initial calculations consisted of determining an optimum H/X (hydrogen to fissile isotope 
concentration) ratio for the maximum allowed amount of fissile isotope in a package.  This would 
provide for the most reactive configuration, and thus the most probable for self-induced criticality.  
This exercise also determined if a single unit would be critical.   The optimized unit was then set in 
an infinite array, as a precursor to individual finite array simulations.  If an infinite array was sub-
critical in which no neutron leakage was present, then a finite array in which considerable neutron 
leakage was present would never go critical.  Finite arrays consisting of 2, 4, 8, and 27 units were 
3then simulated for the potentiality of stacking units during transport.  Finally, the spheres of 239Pu 
and polyethylene in the finite arrays were offset to their nearest neighbors, rather than centered in 
their individual cubic containers.  
Determination of the safety or hazard of a given unit configuration was based on the 
calculation of k-effective.  This is the ratio of the number of neutrons in the present generation of 
activity to the number of neutrons in the previous generation of activity.  This value indicates the 
rate of increasing or decreasing neutron population in a given system, and thus its emission of 
neutrons to the surrounding environment.  A critical system is defined in which k-effective is equal 
to 1, that is, the rate of neutron production equals the rate of loss.  Such a system is unfavorable as it 
presents a serious radiation danger to anyone around it. 
For each simulation 2000 neutrons were run in each of 200 generations.  The first 10 
generations were skipped from calculation.  This removes any bias due to the artificial distribution 
created for the initial generations.  Version 6.7 of the Evaluated Nuclear Data File from Brookhaven 
National Laboratory was used for neutron cross section data since it is the most recent cross section 
library included in the software.
RESULTS
The rise to maximum reactivity for a sphere of 180g 239Pu and high-density polyethylene 
(HDPE) is shown in Figure 1.  Initially, only small incremental amounts of HDPE are required to 
greatly increase keff for the unit.  The maximum occurs when the H/X ratio is approximately 1022, 
after which the reactivity decreases linearly.  The data collected for this optimized unit is shown in 
Table 1.  The calculated keff for a stainless steel type 304 container is 0.8755, while for aluminum it is 
0.7939.  The radius of the sphere is approximately 11 cm, with a mass of 5.6 kilograms.  The 
simulation of an infinite array of these two optimized units demonstrated the need for finite array 
4analysis, as both were super-critical.  Infinite arrays of the SS 304 contained unit and aluminum 
contained unit had keff ’s of 1.0793 and 1.1274, respectively.
Figure 2 illustrates the increase in reactivity for two, four, eight, and twenty-seven centered 
unit finite arrays.  None reached a critical condition.  Figures 6, 7, and 8 are cross section views of 
the finite arrays in question.  Offsetting of the spheres in their given cubes was then considered, 
such that their proximity to other spheres is maximized.  Figures 9 and 10 illustrate a cross section 
view of the offset finite arrays.  The results of these calculations are found in Table 4.  Much fewer 
units were required to reach criticality.  The four unit and eight unit SS 304 contained offset finite 
arrays and the eight unit Al contained offset finite array were considered for separation analysis.
The 100g 239Pu and HDPE spheres were then analyzed.  Figure 3 illustrates a more rigorous 
attempt to identify the optimum H/X ratio.  As the peaks became well defined, one can see a slight 
difference between the SS 304 and aluminum contained units.  For the stainless steel type 304 unit, 
the optimum H/X ratio @ 1100.  The sphere radius is approximately 9.3 cm with a mass of 3.3 
kilograms.  The calculated keff resulted in a value of 0.7395.  For the aluminum unit, the optimum 
H/X ratio @ 1550.  The sphere radius is approximately 10.4 cm with a mass of 4.6 kilograms.  keff for 
this unit was calculated at 0.6465. Tables 2 and 3 present all pertinent information about the above 
two optimized units.  When infinite arrays were modeled, both container types proved to be sub-
critical.  The SS 304 contained unit array achieved a keff of 0.9314 while the aluminum contained unit 
array achieved a keff of 0.9379.  Centered finite arrays were therefore not modeled.  Instead, offset 
finite arrays were modeled with the optimized units.  The data collected from these simulations can 
be found in Table 5.  The 8 unit SS 304 contained offset finite array was considered for separation 
analysis.
Separation analysis consisted of incrementally moving the offset spheres away from an “in-
contact” configuration, to determine the threshold distance at which they would sub-critical. Figure 
54 presents this data.  The 180g 239Pu 4 unit SS 304 contained finite offset array reached a 
conservative sub-critical value of 0.9500 when the separation distance between spheres was ~ 5.0 
cm.  For the 180g 239Pu 8 unit SS 304 contained finite offset array, 0.9500 was achieved at a distance 
of ~12.5 cm.  For the 180g, 8 unit, Al contained finite offset array case, 0.9500 was achieved when 
separation reached ~7.2 cm. Finally, the 100g, 8 unit, SS 304 contained finite array, a separation of 
~1.0 cm is necessary for keff to equal 0.9500.      
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Potential sources of error in this study include idealized geometry configuration, and the use 
of only 200 generations for simulation.  This was chosen only for conserving the time necessary to 
simulate the above geometries.  The use of stainless steel type 304 proves to be more effective at 
reflecting neutrons and would thus provide a more reactive transport unit.  The requirement as 
written in the Code of Federal Regulations is, in this specific case, not adequately conservative to 
prevent the assembly of a critical system.  An offset finite array of 180g plutonium-239/HDPE units 
as illustrated in Figure 10 is a system that would present an extreme hazard to anyone around it.  No 
single unit will ever achieve criticality without some disturbance or reassembly of the configuration, 
along with the presence of other units.  It should be noted that all efforts were made for a 
conservative safety evaluation and that other controls such as stacking restrictions or spacing 
requirements are means of included safety but are beyond the scope of this study.  Additional 
modeling should be conducted to verify the results of this study and to further analyze the adequacy 
of federal regulations concerning fissile-package transport.  Potential accident conditions such as 
fire, flooding, and damage to the container were not under study, nor were any other credible 
abnormal conditions associated with criticality safety analysis.
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TABLES
Table 1- Calculated Data for Optimum 180g Pu-239 Units
Material Density [g/cc] Mass [g] Volume [cc]
Specific Gravity 
[g/cc] H/X Ratio
Pu-239 19.8400 180.0000 9.0726 0.0322 1022.5308
HD-Polyethylene 0.9670 5400.0000 5584.2813 0.9654
C 0.8266
H 0.1387
Radius of Sphere 
[cm]
Total Volume 
[cc] (SS304)
Total Volume 
[cc] (Al)
Length of 
Side [cm] 
(SS304)
Length of Side [cm] 
(Al)
11.0119 51865.8474 138926.6872 37.2930 51.7919
Average Keff for 
SS304:
0.8755
Average Keff for 
Al:
0.7939
7Table 2- Calculated Data for Optimum SS 304 Encased 100g Pu-239 Unit
Material Density [g/cc] Mass [g] Volume [cc] Specific Gravity [g/cc] H/X Ratio
Pu-239 19.8400 100.0000 5.0403 0.0299 1100.0000
HD-
Polyethylene 0.9670 3227.2866 3337.4215 0.9655
C 0.8268
H 0.1388
Radius of 
Sphere [cm]
Total Volume 
[cc] (SS304)
Total Volume 
[cc] (Al)
Length of 
Side [cm] 
(SS304)
Length of Side 
[cm] (Al)
9.2753 49614.9554 136675.7951 36.7455 51.5107
Average Keff
for SS304:
0.7395
Average Keff
for Al:
0.6348
Table 3- Calculated Data for Optimum Al Encased 100g Pu-239 Unit
Material Density [g/cc] Mass [g] Volume [cc] Specific Gravity [g/cc] H/X Ratio
Pu-239 19.8400 100.0000 5.0403 0.0212 1550.0000
HD-
Polyethylene 0.9670 4547.5401 4702.7302 0.9660
C 0.8271
H 0.1388
Radius of 
Sphere [cm]
Total Volume 
[cc] (SS304)
Total Volume 
[cc] (Al)
Length of 
Side [cm] 
(SS304)
Length of Side 
[cm] (Al)
10.3970 50980.2642 138041.1039 37.0795 51.6816
Average Keff
for SS304:
0.7283
Average Keff
for Al:
0.6465
8Table 4- 180g Pu-239 Offset Spheres Arrays
Array 
Configuration 
[close-
packed units]
Keff (SS304) Keff (Al)
1 0.8755 0.7883
2 0.9348 0.8497
4 0.997 0.9333
8 1.087 1.0652
Table 5 - 100g Pu-239 Offset Spheres Arrays
Array 
Configuration 
[close-packed 
units]
Keff (SS304) Keff (Al)
1 0.7395 0.6465
2 0.8049 0.7014
4 0.8783 0.7752
8 0.9752 0.8992
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Figure 1- Optimum H/X Ratio Calculations for 180g Pu-239 Cases
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Figure 2- Approach to Criticality for 180g Pu-239 Finite Arrays
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Figure 3- Optimum H/X Ratio Calculations for 100g Pu-239 Units
10
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Figure 6 - Cross Section of Two Unit Centered Finite Array
Figure 7 - Cross Section of Four and Eight Unit Centered Finite Array
Figure 8 - Cross Section of Twenty-Seven Unit Centered Finite Array
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Figure 9 - Cross Section of Two Unit Offset Finite Array
Figure 10 - Cross Section of Four and Eight Unit Offset Finite Array
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Figure 11 – Cross Section of Four Unit Offset Finite Array During Separation Analysis
